We pose Witsenhausen's problem as a leader-follower game of incomplete information. The follower makes a noisy observation of the leader's action (who moves first) and chooses an action minimizing her expected deviation from the leader's action. Knowing this, leader who observes the realization of the state, chooses an action that minimizes her distance to the state of the world and the ex-ante expected deviation from the follower's action. We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game and identify a class of "near piecewise-linear equilibria" when leader cares much more about being close to the follower than the state, and the precision of the prior is poor. As a major consequence of this result, we prove the existence of a set of local minima for Witsenhausen's problem in form of slopey quantizers, which are at most a constant factor away from the optimal cost. We provide supporting theory for numerical investigations in the literature suggesting optimality of almost piecewise-linear strategies.
finite one through quantized approximations, using which they show that quantized policies are asymptotically optimal for Witsenhausen's counterexample. There are also several works aiming to approximate the optimal solution. Li et al. (2009) ; Baglietto et al. (2001) ; Lee et al. (2001) ; Mehmetoglu et al. (2014) employ different heuristic approaches, all confirming what one might intuitively call an almost piecewise-linear form for the optimal controller. However, a complete optimality proof for such strategies has been elusive.
In this paper, following Witsenhausen's original intuition, we view the problem as a leaderfollower coordination game in which the action of the leader is corrupted by an additive noise, before reaching the follower. The leader aims to coordinate with the follower while staying close to the observed state, recognizing that her action is not observed perfectly. As a result, she needs to signal the follower in a manner that can be decoded efficiently.
More than a mere academic counterexample, the above setup could model a scenario where coordination happens across generations and the insights of the leader who is from a different generation is corrupted/lost by the time the message reaches the future generations. If the leader can internalize the fact that her actions will not be observed perfectly, how should she act to make sure coordination occur? When the leader cares far more about coordination with the follower than staying "on the message", the near piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy of the leader coarsens the observation in well-spaced intervals, rather than merely broadcasting a linearly scaled version of the observed state as the linear strategy would suggest.
To this end, we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game and show that strong complementarity 1 between the leader and the follower combined with a prior with poor enough precision can give rise to nonlinear equilibria, and in particular, equilibria in form of what has been deemed in the literature as slopey quantizers Grover et al. (2009) . We subsequently show that these equilibria are indeed local minima of the original Witsenhausen's problem. Using some related results from asymptotic quantization theory (Panter and Dite (1951); Lloyd (1982) ; Na and Neuhoff (2001)) together with analytical lower bounds on the optimal cost of Witsenhausen's problem derived in Grover et al. (2013) , we further show that these local minima are near-optimal in the sense that their corresponding cost is at most a constant factor away from the optimal one. Our work thus provides an analytical support for the local optimality of slopey quantization 1 Games of strategic complementarities are those in which the best response of each player is increasing in actions of others Vives (2005) . strategies for Witsenhausen's counterexample.
The main idea behind the proof is to carefully construct a class of what we informally refer to as near piecewise-linear or slopey quantization strategies for the leader that stays invariant under the best response operator. These strategies can be viewed as small-slope variations of a fixed-rate scalar quantizer minimizing the mean squared quantization error (Panter and Dite (1951) ; Lloyd (1982) ; Na and Neuhoff (2001) ). Such an optimal quantizer is characterized by optimality conditions on the threshold levels which determine the boundaries of the quantization cells (or segments) and quantization levels: i) quantization levels must be the centroid of the segments, and ii) thresholds in between two adjacent quantization levels must be equidistant from them. For any fixed number of segments, we consider the strategies whose segments are in a vicinity of the optimal MSE quantizer, have a unique fixed point in each segment close to the quantization level, and are almost linear within each segment with a near-zero derivative.
For such strategies, leader's actions remain very close to fixed points of the strategy in each segment. Therefore, well-spaced fixed points (combined with appropriate relative prior of the state in different segments) reveal the leader's actions to the follower with high probability, making the "signal" easily decodable. As a consequence, we can characterize the best response of the follower to leader's strategy. Using this characterization, we show that the best response of the leader to follower's strategy also varies very little, essentially remaining near piecewise-linear over most of the range of the observed signals.
A key challenge in deriving the invariance property for this set of strategies for the leader is to bound and tightly control the displacement in the fixed points and endpoints of the segments of leader's strategy under the action of the best response operator. One major observation here is that the fixed points of the leader's best responses are local minimizers of the expected deviation of the leader's action from the follower. As has been documented in Wu and Verdú (2011) , the expected deviation is a non convex functional that is the main reason the problem is hard to solve.
This insight allows us to show that the fixed points of the leader's best response lie in a tight neighborhood of the fixed points of the follower's strategy. We then show that the fixed points of the follower's strategy in turn lie in a vicinity of a convex combination of the leader's fixed points and the expected value of the state of the world within each segment. Combining the two, we can derive an approximate dynamics for the displacement in the fixed points and endpoints of the segments in leader's strategy under the best response. Using this approximate dynamics, we then characterize an invariant set of fixed points and interval endpoints for leader's strategy, which we can then use in order to prove the existence of a near piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy for the leader.
II. MODEL
We view Witsenhausen's problem (Witsenhausen (1968) ) as a game between a leader L and a follower F . Before the agents act, the state of the world θ is drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2 . The leader can observe the realization of θ and acts first. The payoff of the leader is given as follows
where a F is the action of the follower and 0 < r L < 1. The follower makes a private, noisy observation of the leader's action, s = a L + δ where δ ∼ N (0, 1). The payoff of the follower is given by
We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game and show that they reduce to the Bayes Nash equilibria due to the Gaussian noise in the observation. 2 Denote with a * L (θ) and a * F (s) the equilibrium strategies, and with ν * (·|s) the follower's belief about leader's action given s. Due to the normal noise in the observation, ν * (·|s) is fully determined by a * L (θ) and the prior as there are no off-equilibrium-path information sets. Equilibrium strategies should thus satisfy
where φ(·) denotes the PDF of the standard normal distribution.
Our model yields the original setup in Witsenhausen (1968) by choosing
The expected control cost then maps to the (negated) expected payoff of the leader. It is a simple exercise to find the optimal solution to Witsenhausen's problem in the class of linear strategies 2 See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium.
(see Lemma 11 in Witsenhausen (1968) ), which is also an equilibrium of the game described above. Witsenhausen (Witsenhausen (1968) ) showed that, for sufficiently large σ, this linear solution is not optimal. In fact, the linear solution can be extremely suboptimal in the sense that the asymptotic ratio of the corresponding cost to the optimal one is infinity (Mitter and Sahai (1999) ). Our objective in this paper is to characterize a set of local minima for the problem in Witsenhausen (1968) , with a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader and a cost within a constant factor of the optimal one, given a sufficiently large σ.
To this end, we analyze the equilibria of the game described above in regime 1 2 ≤ r L σ 2 ≤ 1 and sufficiently large σ.
III. NONLINEAR EQUILIBRIA
We first prove the existence of a collection of equilibria with a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader for sufficiently large values of σ. 4 Our approach is to identify a set of such strategies for the leader which is invariant under the best response operator. We characterize such a set in the next section.
A. An Invariant Set of Near Piecewise-Linear Strategies for the Leader
Given m ∈ N, consider a partition of the normal distribution N (0, σ 2 ) into 2m + 1 segments for k ∈ N m . We can show that such a partition exists and is unique. This partition in fact corresponds to the (2m + 1)-level fixed-rate scalar quantizer that minimizes the mean-square distortion for a source characterized by θ ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) (Panter and Dite (1951); Lloyd (1982); Na and Neuhoff (2001)). The properties of this quantizer as m → ∞ are extensively studied in asymptotic quantization theory, as will be discussed and used in analysing the performance of our proposed local minima in Section IV.
3 This clearly covers the case k 2 σ 2 = 1.
4 From now on and for the sake of brevity, we may avoid reasserting the "sufficiently large σ" requirement. All the results are derived under this assumption unless specified otherwise. Roughly speaking, the set of strategies we propose for the leader are a class of (2m + 1)-segmented strategies with segments being close to B
, with a fixed point in each segment in a certain vicinity of c
, and almost linear with a slope close to r L over each segment. Before proceeding further, we present some (non-asymptotic) properties of this base configuration, which will facilitate the proof of the invariance property for the proposed set of strategies.
Lemma 1. Given m ∈ N, consider the partition of the normal distribution N (0, σ 2 ) in a (2m+1)-level optimal MSE quantizer as described above. Let
As a result, 1 ≤
Proof. See the appendix.
Next, we construct a set of (2m+1)-segmented increasing odd functions, denoted by A m L (r L , σ) satisfying the following properties:
• a L (θ) is increasing and odd (i.e., a L (−θ) = −a L (θ)), and is smooth over each interval.
• a L (θ) has a unique fixed point in each segment. That is, for each interval
We also impose the constraint that interval endpoints b k remain close to midpoints of [c k−1 , c k ]
and that fixed points c k remain within certain vicinity of c 0 k 's.
From the above property, if we definex Finally, we impose a constraint on the slope of a L (θ) in each interval, keeping the slope very close to r L , as well as a linear bound on a L (θ) in the tail. More precisely, we impose the following property: 
We can then use these properties to find the updated best response of the leader to a F (s), denoted byã L (θ) and enforce its inclusion
The follower's best response to the strategy of the leader a L (θ) is the expected action of the
Following a simple application of Bayes rule we can obtain
Using this, we can easily show that a F (s) is analytic and increasing, with
(see Witsenhausen (1968) for a proof).
In order to characterize a F (s), we start by estimating the expected action of the leader and its variance conditioned on the interval to which θ belongs. Actions of the leader in interval B k
from which the lemma below follows immediately.
The analysis is a bit involved in the tail, since for θ > c m the leader's actions are not in a bounded vicinity of c m anymore. However, we can derive several useful properties for the tail as well.
Lemma 3. Consider a tail observation by the leader (i.e., θ ∈ B m ). Then,
Let the signal observed by the follower be between c k and c k+1 , i.e., s = c k + δ with 0 ≤ δ ≤ c k+1 − c k . Then, we claim that the follower's posterior on θ given s has a negligible probability out of the neighboring intervals B k ∪ B k+1 .
Lemma 4. Let the observed signal by the follower be s = c k + δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ c k+1 − c k ,
Using this lemma and the fact that the fixed points c k are well-spaced, we can show that the effect of the intervals other than B k and B k+1 on a F (s) are negligible. In order to characterize the follower's best response a F (s), we then need to focus only on the segments adjacent to the observed signal, and in particular figure out the weight of each of these two neighboring intervals in the follower's posterior on θ. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Define
where ∆ k+1 = c k+1 − c k . Also, write the signal observed by the follower as s = m k+1 + δ. Then,
For the case involving the tail segment B m ,
It is worth mentioning that m k+1 defined in the above lemma is quite close to the midpoint of c k and c k+1 . In fact, using Lemma 1 we can show that |m k+1 −
. We can now characterize the best response of the follower a F (s) to the leader's strategy
Corollary 1. A useful consequence of Lemma 6 is that
where s = m k+1 + δ, with c k ≤ s ≤ c k+1 .
Note that the exponential terms in the above bounds vanish quite fast for large ∆ k+1 and |δ|.
for small |δ|, another useful upper bound on the derivative of a F (s) is
Corollary 2. Let s = m k+1 + δ, with c k ≤ s ≤ c k+1 . Then,
Roughly speaking, the above corollary says that, if the observed signal by the follower is far enough from the midpoint of c k and c k+1 , then the optimal action of the follower is wellconcentrated around c k or c k+1 (whichever that is closer), and changes very slowly according to Lemma 6. 7 However, a F (s) may have very high variations for s close to m k+1 as can be seen from Lemma 6.
The following lemma characterizes a F (s) when follower makes a tail observation.
Lemma 6 and 7 provide the first order characteristics of the best response of the follower to
We are now ready to analyze the leader's best responsẽ
7 Note that
The pointsb k+1 determine the segments of the best response strategyã L (θ). We can bound the derivative ofã L (θ) over these segments by incorporating Lemma 6 and Corollary 1 and 2
into the above bound.
Using this lemma and the valuesr
This means that Property 3 is preserved by the best response for θ ∈ [−c m , c m ]. We study the tail case later in Lemma 11. Next, we characterize the fixed points of the best response strategyã L (θ).
The above lemma implies that Property 1 is also preserved under the best response. Next lemma describes the tail properties ofã L (θ).
Proof. See the appendix. Now, in order to verify that the updated strategyã L (θ) satisfies Property 2, we need to bound the displacements in the fixed pointsc k and endpointsb k .
Lemma 12. For the endpoints of the intervals corresponding toã L (θ), we have
Bounding the displacement inc k can be done in multiple steps: first we need to relate the fixed point of the leader's best responseã L (θ) in intervalB k to the fixed point of a F (s) in B k (i.e., s k ), followed by estimating s k in terms of c k and e k (recall that e k = E N (0,σ 2 ) [θ|θ ∈ B k ], i.e., the expected value of θ over B k ). Finally we bound the displacement in e k with the displacement of the interval endpoints using properties of truncated normal distribution.
Proof. See the appendix. Lemma 14. s k can be located based on c k and e k as
Using Lemma 12-14, we can reach at
. We can now use (III-B) and Lemma 12 to verify that Property 2 is also preserved by the best response, completing the proof of the invariance of A m L (r L , σ) for m ∈ M (σ) and sufficiently large σ in the regime 1 2 ≤ r L σ 2 ≤ 1. This is carried out in the proof of the following theorem.
for the leader, characterized by Property 1-3, is invariant under the best response for any m ∈ M (σ) = {m ∈ N|2 √ 2 ln σ + 4 < x 0 1 < 4 √ ln σ}, for sufficiently large (but finite) σ. Moreover, the game described in Section II has an equilibrium for which
for any two measurable functions a L , a F : R → R. As discussed in Section II, U (a L , a F ) defined above maps to the expected cost of the original Witsenhausen's problem in Witsenhausen (1968) .
The aim of this section is to study the performance of the equilibrium strategies characterized by Theorem 1 in view of the above cost function.
It is easy to verify that the cost functional U (a L , a F ) is Fréchet differentiable (Luenberger (1997)). It follows then that the first variation of U vanishes at any pair of equilibrium strategies
is a stationary point of the cost functional U . Being an equilibrium also implies that the cost cannot be improved by changing one of the strategies a * L or a * F while keeping the other fixed, although this does not 
9 , is a local minimum of the cost functional U in (IV).
We now have the first main result of the paper: a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader We next aim to evaluate the performance of these local minima with respect to the optimal cost. Looking at the proof of Theorem 1, we can see that
. Therefore, we can use any other pair of strategies with the leader's strategy being in A m L (for which it is easier to evaluate the cost) to find an upper bound for U (a * 
8 We thank Anant Sahai for bringing this point into the authors' attention.
9 Recall that δ ∼ N (0, 1) is the noise in the follower's observation. 
Another interesting exact asymptotic equality is (2m + 1)
using which we can alter-
as m → ∞. 10 We have the following lemma.
Lemma 16. For the pair of equilibrium strategies (a *
this implies the existence of a local minimum with near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader with a cost (asymptotically) as low as
. To compare with the optimal solution, we use the lower bounds on the optimal cost of Witsenhausen's problem derived in Grover et al. (2013) .
The following lemma is an immediate result of Theorem 4 in Grover et al. (2013) .
Lemma 17. Denote with U * (σ) the minimum value of the cost functional U (a L , a F ) given by
10 A relevant open problem is to find the exact asymptotic value of the support region of the optimal quantizer, that is b 0 m in our setting (see Na and Neuhoff (2001) for some related results). This lower bound is quite loose (as also pointed out by the authors in Grover et al. (2013) ), but still serves our purpose of showing that our proposed local optima are only a constant factor away from the optimal cost as σ → ∞.
11 We summarize the main findings of this section in the theorem below.
Theorem 2. Any pair of equilibrium strategies (a * L , a * F ) characterized by Theorem 1, where
, is a local minimum of the cost functional U in (IV). Moreover, the set M (σ) is nonempty for sufficiently large values of σ and,
In the regime r L σ 2 = 1, all these local minima are within constant factor of the optimal cost, with at least one being less than 27.8 times away from the optimal value as σ → ∞.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We studied Witsenhausen's counterexample in a leader-follower game setup where the follower makes noisy observations from the leader's action and aims to choose her action as close as possible to that of the leader. Leader who moves first and can see the realization of the state of the world chooses her action to minimize her ex-ante distance from the follower's action as well as the state of the world. We showed the existence of nonlinear perfect Bayesian equilibria in the regime 1 2 ≤ r L σ 2 ≤ 1, where the leader's strategy is a perturbed slopey variation of an optimal MSE quantizer. We then proved that these equilibria are indeed local minima of the original Witsenhausen's problem. Incorporating some relevant results from asymptotic quantization theory and lower bounds on the optimal cost of Witsenhausen's problem from the literature, we showed that the proposed local minima are near-optimal in that they are at most a constant factor away from the optimal one. Our work hence provides a supporting theory for the local optimality of near piecewise-linear strategies for Witsenhausen's problem. 11 The ratio between the upper and lower bounds in Grover et al. (2013) is almost 100. For the well-known case of σ = 5 and k 2 σ 2 = 1, the lowest known cost ≈ 0.167 is higher than 12.5 times the value obtained from the lower bound. 
All the expectations are then taken using N (0, 1) as the probability measure.
e.g. Horrace (2015) for a proof). This implies that 0 ≤ 1 −ĉ mxm ≤x 2 m . Moreover,x m is decreasing with m and it follows from direct calculation thatx 2 = 0.48 < 1 2 , hence completing the proof.
ii) Sinceĉ k is the centroid of segmentB k , we should have
This, together with the fact that
Noting that φ(θ) (for θ ≥ 0) andĉ k − θ are decreasing with θ, we apply algebraic Chebyshev inequality to (A)
Combining the two, we can derive the LHS in (1). It then immediately follows from the LHS inequality thatx k ≤x k+1 for 1 ≤ k. Applying the result of part (i) to the RHS inequality we can easily show thatx
iii) A useful property here is that g(x) = 1 x a+x a φ(t)dt is decreasing in x for x, a > 0. Using this, we can obtain
where the last two lines follow from part (ii). We have to modify the proof for k = m. To extend the proof to the case k = m, it suffices to show that Prob[θ|θ
where we have used part (i) in the last inequality. The proof now follows from the fact
iv) We start by showing that
The LHS easily follows from part (ii), while the RHS requires a more involved analysis as we elaborate below. The idea here is to find an appropriate lower bound for the RHS of (A). Using Jensen's inequality for the concave function e −x , we can obtain
Combining this with the same upper bound ofx and after some simplification we can reach at
4 .
Substituting k with 1, . . . , k − 1 and multiplying all these k inequalities we can prove the RHS inequality in (A).
Incorporating the simple inequality
≤ √ e into (A), we can find that
Adding up all these inequalities
. Based on the RHS of (A) and following a similar approach we can show that
On the other hand,
θ 2 dθ ≤ 6e
where the last inequality follows from (A) and part (i). Putting (A) and ( ≤x mĉm ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. This is an immediate result of Property 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. We start with the case where a L (c m + σx m+1 ) ≤ s ≤ c m +x m+1 . Let
With some manipulation, we can show that for every
Integrating with respect to θ and after some simplification, we arrive at
1+r 2 σ 2 , and
Therefore,
As for the variance,
Now, we aim to use the bound Var
for sufficiently large σ and using the easily verifiable fact thatμ ≤x m + 1. Similar results to the above can be derived for the case where a L (b m ) ≤ s < a L (θ c ), using θ s instead of θ c , where
The same for the case s < a L (b m ), following a similar argument
1+r 2 σ 2 , and δ b = a L (b m ) − s > 0. Now we bring into play the tail effect. For every θ ≥ θ c , we use
, using which for s = c m + δ with 0 ≤ δ ≤x m+1 , we get
Therefore, for θ ≥ θ c
June 2017 DRAFT Using the inequality h ≤ ρ(h) ≤ h 2 +1 h for h > 0, we can show that
. This, along with (A) and 0 ≤ δ ≤x m+1 and θ c = c m + σx m+1 yields
for θ ≥ θ c . Using this along with (A), we can obtain
for sufficiently large σ.
For s < c m−1 , we use the fact that Var[θ|s,
As for the effect of θ > θ c , we can easily see that for s < c m (A) becomes
.
We can use this to bound the variance similar to (A):
For the case where s > c m +x m+1 (i.e., δ >x m+1 ), let θ s = c m + σδ. Then, similar to (A)
we can obtain
for θ ≥ θ s . Using this and similar to (A), we can reach at
To bound the variance, similar to (A) we can show
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. From the properties of the base configuration, it is easy to see that
To prove the lemma for k < m, we write Proof of Lemma 5. If s ≥ c k +rx k+2 , then
where the last inequality follows from the definition of m k+1 . However, for the case where s < c k +rx k+2 , the upper bound on the likelihood Prob[s|θ ∈ B k ] in the first inequality may be less and hence is replaced by 1, which will thereby lead to
The other side of the inequality can be proved similarly.
For the case k = m − 1, the lower bound φ(m k+1 + δ − c k+1 −rx k+2 ) for the likelihood 
On the other hand, we can show that Prob [θ∈Bm] Prob[θ∈Bm] < 1.16, which completes the proof. It is easy to see that the inequality in LHS stays as before for k = m − 1.
Proof of Lemma 6. As the first step we bound the effect of intervals other than B k ∪ B k+1 . Let
where we have used the identity ∞ j=0 e −j 2 ≈ 1.386. Similarly, we can bound the effect of non-neighboring intervals on the variance:
Combining the two, we obtain
Therefore, the effect of intervals other than B k and B k+1 on a F (s) (and its derivative given by Var[a L |s]) is quite negligible. Now, focusing on these two intervals (i.e., B k and B k+1 ), we have
The proof for the upper bound on a F (s) now follows from Lemma 5. The proof for the lower bound on a F (s) is similar. Now, as for the derivative, we first note that
The rest easily follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 7. Exploiting the term e −δ(cm−c m−r −2rσ) in (A) (for k = m), it is easy to observe that the same upper bounds given by (A) and (A) hold for the effect of intervals other than B m on a F (s) provided
Verifying the above inequality is quite straightforward using Lemma 3, and specially noting that
The proof of the lemma is now an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 8. We start by showing that
With some manipulation and using ρ(h) ≥ h, we can obtain
Similarly,
Using a F (s) ≤ s + 1.1x m , we can show
k+2 .
Combining these, we can arrive at
For the case of k = m,
using which it is straightforward to verify that (A) holds for k = m as well (definex m+2 =x m+1 for consistency).
. We first show thatã L (θ) lies in a 5rx m+1 -vicinity of either c k or c k+1 . We begin with the case whereã
. We can use Corollary 2 to obtain a lower bound forJ L (ã L ):
Putting this together withũ
, it is easy to show that − 1.1rx m+1 < ∆ k+1 √ σ for sufficiently large σ. A second use of Corollary 2 now
On the other hand, using (A), we getũ
, and
from which it easily follows that < 1.1. Now an argument similar to the caseã Proof of Lemma 9. Using
Based on this, the first order condition forã L gives
Getting partial derivative with respect to θ we get
Similar to (A) and using (1) and (III-B), and a bit of manipulation we can obtain
for sufficiently largex k+2 (or equivalently σ).
For s > c m +x m+1 , using Lemma 7 and the fact thatã
Hence,
The case k = m is even easier on noting that 
Now, to bound the other term assume
We break it into two parts. First, using an approach similar to (A), we can obtain
And,
Putting all together, we get
Now for the other side, on noting that a F (s) ≤ s + 1.1x m+1 and
, we can get
For
2 . An approach similar to (A) leads to
, then a F (s) < c k + 5.8rx k+2 and thus (a
Similar argument holds for k = m. The proof now follows from (A), (A), and (A).
Proof of Lemma 10. We have already calculated the second derivative ofJ L when deriving the partial derivative in (A). The same argument implies
implies thatJ L is strongly convex. It's unique minimizerc k minimizes both losses in the leader's payoff, hence it is the fixed point ofã
Proof of Lemma 11. The caseb m < θ ≤ c m follows from Lemma 9, so we only need to consider θ > c m . As the first step, we derive some useful lower bounds onJ L (a L ) for a L = c m + with ≥ 0. In particular, we claim that for >rx m+1 and sufficiently large σ, we havẽ
We consider two cases: If
2 . These two observations result in the lower bound in (A) for sufficiently large σ.
Using an approach similar to Lemma 8, we can show that < 2 * where
from which we easily get < 2.02r L (δ +x m+1 ). Using this, the proof of the second part of the lemma is quite straightforward.
As for
is covered in Lemma 9. Hence, we study the
2r L (σx m+1 + 5rx m+1 +x m+1 ) < 2.4 and similar to (A), we can obtain
Also,
On the other hand, similar to (A), we have
To bound the other term, usingã
for s ≥ c m +x m+1 and similar to (A), we can show that
m+1 .
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For s ≤ c m +x m+1 , we have a F (s) <ã L . Therefore,
For the other side, similar to (A), we have
Also, same as (A),
And similar to (A),
On the other hand, using Lemma 6 and 7, we can verify that
From the above analysis it follows that
Using this and (A), and following exact same steps as in the proof of Lemma 9, we can show
where we recall that a F (s k ) = s k . Noting that the upper bound on the derivative of a F (s) in (1) is increasing for s k ≤ s ≤ m k+1 , we can write
2 + (9.6r 
Similarly, using (III-B) and Lemma 7 we can show that
These two yieldJ L (s k ) < 0.2r 2 L for sufficiently large σ. It is easy to verify that the same hold when k = m. The analysis in this case is even simpler on noting that Applying the Envelope's theorem to (III-B), we get
Integrating this, along the inequality below
we get
where we useũ L (θ, ·) as a short-note forũ L (θ,ã L (θ)). Now, we note that at the endpoint θ =b k+1 , the above should also hold forc k+1 . Using this and noting 0 <ũ
using which the proof of the lemma is trivial.
Proof of Lemma 13. Using Corollary 2, it is straightforward to show that
where we have also used s k = a F (s k ). We consider the case
With a bit of manipulation, we can obtain
As for the second term, similarly
By putting all together it is easy to verify that for sufficiently large σ
On the other hand, as we showed before
Lx 1 away from the minimizer at which the first derivative is zero. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 14. We start by finding the fixed point of
Noting thatŝ k is close to c k and in particular |a L (θ) −ŝ k | < 1 for θ ∈ B k , and that xφ(x) is increasing for |x| < 1, together with the fact that
Therefore by finding the solution of
we can upper-bound the fixed
1+r 2 σ 2 ). A quick bound for y can be obtained from
1+r 2 σ 2 y, which yields y − e k ≤r 2 σ 2 e k < 0.1x k . An alternative representation of (A) is
where ∆b k (y) =r
. Applying these to the above equation we can obtain
,
we can reach atŝ
Following a similar argument to lower-boundŝ k , we can show that
To find the fixed point of a F (s) in B k (that is a F (s k ) = s k ), we first note thatŝ k lies within
Lemma 6 we can obtain
Assumeŝ k ≥ c k (the other case is similar). We have already shown as part of Lemma 6 that while observing s ∈ [c k , c k+1 ], the effect of intervals other than B k ∪ B k+1 on a F (s) is negligible (as given by (A)). Similarly, and by using Lemma 5, we can show that
where δ = m k+1 −ŝ k . Combining this and (A), we can arrive at
After all, we have
The proof has to be modified for the tail case k = m, since in the tail |a L (θ) −ŝ m | < 1
does not hold for all θ ∈ B m . To handle this, we define E[a L (θ)|ŝ m , θ ∈B m ] =ŝ m , wherê
It is easy to verify thatr(σ 2 − σ) < 1 and hence |a L (θ) −ŝ m | < 1 holds in this interval. We also need to find an alternative to the variance inequality Var
Also, we can show ∆b m (y) <re m , from which and a bit manipulation we can reach at Var
(1−r) 2 . We can then show that the results derived above also holds forB m . More precisely,
We can easily observe that
We also need to bound
Therefore, the same steps as in the non-tail case can be followed in this case as well, resulting in (A) to also hold for k = m.
Proof of Theorem 1. The first step is to use (III-B) to verify that Property 2 is also preserved by the best response, completing the proof of the invariance of A m L . From (III-B) we get
Thus to prove that Property 2 is preserved under the best response, it suffices to show that
To bound |ê k − c 0 k |, we first note that
. Using the inequality
2(1+ √ e)σ 2 ). Therefore to have (A), it suffices to have
which is satisfied for sufficiently large values of σ on noting that
. This 
Then, using the invariance property of
is indeed an equilibrium of the game. To see this, we first note that a * F (s) almost surely matches the best response of the follower to the leader's strategy a * L (θ). Otherwise, replacing it with the best response will improve the ex-ante expected payoff of the leader. Noting that both a * F (s) and the best response to a * L (θ) are analytic, almost surely equivalence implies exact equivalence. Similarly, a * L (θ) has to coincide with the best response to a * Proof of Lemma 15. We need to prove that there does not exist an infinitesimal variation of given specifically by Lemma 6-7 and Lemma 14 also hold for a δ F , noting that these are all we need to deduce Property 1-3 for the leader's best response (which define the set A m L ). What is left is then to show that the properties for a * F given by Lemma 6-7 and Lemma 14 also hold for a δ F (s) = E[a δ L |s] for sufficiently small δ. The proof easily follows from a couple of simple observations. First, it is straightforward to verify that all the bounds given for a * F in the aforementioned lemmas are indeed strict. Therefore, by recasting the corresponding inequalities as continuous functions of δ L we can ensure that all of them will still hold for sufficiently small δ L . We elaborate on this in more details in what follows.
We start by verifying that Lemma 2-3 also hold for a δ L for small enough δ L . In Lemma 2,
for small enough δ L where we recall thatx k+1 = x 0 k+1 + 3. Similarly we can show that a δ L (θ) − c * k ≥ −rx k , hence Lemma 2 also holds for a δ L . Next, we study the effect of δ L in Lemma 3. As for (A), using
the RHS of the inequality will be multiplied by e −δ 2 L −2δ Lxm+1 . As a result, the value of ξ in (A) will be multiplied by e , using which we can verify that (A) still holds for small enough δ L . The rest of the changes are similar.
Lemma 4-5 are based on Lemma 2-3, and Lemma 6-7 are derived using Lemma 2-5, hence also hold for a δ F . Finally, in Lemma 14 which is about the fixed points of the follower's strategy, noting a
we need to add δ L to the RHS of (A). Using this, we can easily verify that this lemma also holds for a δ F . Therefore, all the properties required for the follower's strategy to deduce Property 1-3 for the leader's best response are satisfied for a 
Using this, we can obtain
Combining this with the inequality On the other hand,
Proof of Lemma 17. First we note that the minimum value of the cost functional U (a L , a F ) with r L σ 2 = 1 is asymptotically the same as the optimal cost of Witsenhausen's problem for away from the optimal cost as σ → ∞.
